Reasons abound for assessing the potential advances of nanoscale manipulation with much optimism. This was even more so on the eve of the creation of the 2003 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act. At a certain level of logic there seemed to be no option then but to forge ahead. The voices helping to frame the initiative heralded the new wave of nanoscience as the key to future competitiveness and human happiness. In this commentary, my emphasis is on bringing to awareness other counterbalancing perspectives regarding the societal implications of R&D activity. I underscore the repercussions that the incorporation and naturalization of nanotechnology within society perforce starts to have in the midst of human life and organization. I summarize (i) how the top policy, although limited and internally contradictory with regards to engaging R&D pluralistically and socio-technically, provides outlets for reckoning with the inevitable repercussions of the social deployment of nanotechnology; (ii) what some of the societal challenges with which nanotechnology is confronting us are; and (iii) what current research is being carried out that provides models for subsequent nanoscience-related policy development in the right socio-technical direction.
Reasons abound for assessing the potential advances of nanoscale manipulation with much optimism. This was even more so a decade ago, on the eve of the creation of the 2003 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act [1] . NRDA represented the pioneering federal mandate signed by then President George W. Bush, and which President Clinton foregrounds at Caltech in 2000 as he announced the National Nanotechnology Initiative. The Act made possible the reorganization of multiple capacities in the US federal administration and its budget to set structures to embark nationally upon the exploration of a then unprecedented scientifi c wave. No doubt that technoscientifi c vision for the future was felt to be just around the corner. If the US wished to secure advantage over the opportunities lying ahead, it then had to seize the day by means of top-heavy policy implementation (e.g., [2] ). Operant in this vision are images of far more effective production of consumer goods (such as the geographically localized versatile productions owing to generalpurpose " fabricators " ) as are images of precision medical devices targeting a microscopically localized disease inside of our bodies (such as intracellular reparative nanomachines or nano-based implants) [3] . At a certain level of logic (one centering about the often taken-for-granted imaginary of the nation-state as privileged socio-organizational level) there seemed to be no option then but to forge ahead, just as there does not seem to be one now either, given the human impulse toward exercising our wellintentioned curiosity, paired with present-day national priorities on the global stage. The voices helping to frame the initiative, although expressing a certain level of caution about some potential side effects to the transformation ahead, heralded the new wave of nanoscience as the key to future competitiveness and, at times, even enduring human happiness (e.g., [4, 5] ).
This commentary is not so much to put a damper on the initial optimism during our still early stages in the creation and social assimilation of nanoscience-derived technologies. Rather, my emphasis is on bringing to awareness perhaps other counterbalancing perspectives regarding the societal implications of R&D activity. From a technoscientifi c perspective, my focus here should be on other stages in the life cycle of the emerging nanotechnologies, especially those stages subsequent to the initial laboratory stage of development and production. During research, development, and production, the technological aspects of potential nano-based innovations still remain secluded, relatively speaking , from their " lesser technical " and " future " social medium, that is, their sociointeractive capacities still being relatively untested.
From a socio-technical perspective, however, it has been judiciously argued and supported that the laboratory precincts (technoscientifi cally conceived of as purely technical) are in reality socio-technical loci where important " extra-technical " , socially relevant, governance takes place and is determined (e.g., [6, 7] ). Thus, from this latter perspective, I wish to further emphasize, as a matter of degree perhaps, the implications brought by the widespread incorporation, into " extralab " social organization, of nanoproducts, nanodevices, and eventually more complex nano-based systems.
Any technological incorporation into society is perforce socio -technical. This hyphenated term underscores hybrid social-and-technical causalities and effects. That is to say, and to simplify a complex argument, the moment that the technology is " transferred " , so to speak, into public life from the controlled environment of its initial R&D experimental realms, that technology then ceases to be purely isolated from its (new) social contextualization, and starts to enroll in social dynamics that " appropriate " the technology so as to generate potentially unforeseeable scenarios from the techno-scientifi c perspective on R&D activity. That technology then begins to exist in sorts of in vivo contexts, using an analogy from the life sciences, a context diffi cult to specify (that is, to foresee qua a playground of socio-technical interactions) from within the walls of the birthing laboratories where the technology is created in in vitro contexts, relatively speaking. By contact, the new " host " social organization infuses back, so to speak, a life of its own to the " unsuspecting " technologies leaving their birthplace. Thus, ultimately, through this commentary, I wish to preferentially underscore the repercussions that such an incorporation and naturalization of nanotechnology perforce starts to have in the midst of human life and social organization. In what follows I summarize (i) how the extant top policy, although limited and internally contradictory with regards to engaging R&D pluralistically and sociotechnically, provides outlets for reckoning with the inevitable repercussions of the social deployment of nanotechnology;
(ii) what some of the societal challenges with which nanotechnology is confronting us are; and (iii) what type of current socio-technical research programs are being carried out that provide models in the right direction not only for subsequent nanoscience-related policy development but also perhaps in the case of that for many other emerging technologies.
The congressional launching of nanotechnology
To be fair at the outset, the foundational Act of 2003 is pioneering in the American science policy landscape in that it explicitly identifi es (by means of Program Activity number 10) the need to anticipate societal repercussions in creating nanotechnology. This is so compared to, for instance, similar legislation in the past on the human genome decoding program or earlier on the space program. The Act seeks to address that research, development, and applications be carried out responsibly. This ought to be done by conducting and disseminating societal research; integrating societal research into nanotechnology research and development; and conducting engagement activities with members of the public. Additionally, the Act mandates the creation of centers, one of which, the American Nanotechnology Preparedness Center (ANPC), has the sole objective of identifying anticipated issues toward the responsible research, development, and application of the technologies. Through the ANPC provision, the National Science Foundation later established (in 2005) centers dedicated to the study of nanotechnology in society, at Arizona State University and the University of California in Santa Barbara. Lastly, the Act enables the creation of the National Nanotechnology Advisory Panel (NNAP). Among its responsibilities, the Panel evaluates whether activities under the National Nanotechnology Initiative adequately address societal implications [8] .
Fundamental programmatic tensions within the very same policy, however, have been pointed out in the recent nanorelated policy literature. The one program activity devoted to ensuring that socially sensitive and responsible development be observed enters in confl ict with Program Activity 7 at the stage of actual implementation [8] . Namely, whereas Program Activity 7 dictates swift development and commercialization to secure the material (economic) and strategic competitiveness of the US in the global arena, activities dedicated to probing potential societal implications of the new technologies require a rather paused, sometimes stepwise, and ever so refl ective approach to the potential ramifi cations of developing technologies [9] . As noted above, NRDA attempted to incorporate past experience from parallel science policy formulation, owing, in part, to the testimony of expert citizens such as political scientist Langdon Winner. During the congressional hearings on the NRDA bill, Professor Winner echoed the criticism and frustration of many about past unsuccessful attempts to integrate societal foresight constitutively into policy for other technological waves (nuclear, GMO, biomedical) which followed the technocrat-as-gatekeeper model of societal assessment after the technology is entrenched in our midst to stay [10] .
Challenges
Structurally, the Achilles ' heel of the nano-development wave is perhaps the limited understanding we have systemically about the technologies in themselves, and as these become integrated into the living, the natural, and the social systems. Not only is this limited understanding affecting the lay public ' s abilities to engage in debates as knowledgeable and active agents but it is also affecting attorneys, policy experts, government offi cials, and elected politicians, who lack the expert knowledge required by this revolutionary scientifi c and social wave. Laypersons as well as the elite policy class entrusted as a whole to help set basic regulatory and developmental parameters seem to share in their consequent passivity and limited engagement vis-à -vis the well-funded technical, scientifi c, and business cadres forging the development and commercialization of such a technology.
This critical lack of public and expert awareness alike has shielded nanoscale R&D and its funding from public scrutiny. Integrating the technology into our midst thus faces the unintended consequence of engendering deep-seated perceptions of uncertainty and risk [11] . This is so as follows. First, a deficit in research-based socio-technical knowledge regarding nano-R&D and, second, the absence of mechanisms for shaping socio-scientifi cally informed publics through Science, Technology, and Society (STS) education have consequences throughout the expert-policy and lay communities alike. These two R&E-related (research and education) limitations tax the processes and structures in place for regulating R&D of emergent technologies with further levels of uncertainty. On the one hand, the lack of understanding among the R&D policy and industrial cadres limit the possibilities for regulating the development of nanoscience and technology with a reasonable degree of certainty. On the other hand, in the absence of reliable knowledge circulating among non-expert publics, futuristic scenarios driven by techno-deterministic hype have the effect of distorting and limiting the repertory of realistic imaginaries available to societies, instead of grounding the socio-technical potential and possibilities of the emergent technologies in rather more informed and plausible (that is, less uncertain) scenarios 2, 5, or 10 years from any given day.
A pivotal European precedent exists about how lack of public awareness and participation in concerns about emerging-technology R&D can undermine the best private and national intentions alike for commercializing these technologies. In the late 1990s, the controversy over genetically modifi ed foods proved costly to the likes of private interests such as Monsanto, whose chief offi cer, Robert Shapiro, fi nally acknowledged the failure to listen to and to take into account public concerns about GMO-related R&D, whether these will ultimately prove to be founded, unfounded, or mixed. From the perspective of Monsanto, the net result was an expensive setback and the failure to establish a sizable new market [12] . Whereas for Monsanto the incident frames itself as a " problem " counterfactually to have been fi xed unilaterally through improved marketing communication, the same situation can be interpreted, however, as a success story from the perspective of publics behaving according to supply-and-demand market logics, through product rejection in this particular case. In accordance with the latter perspective, the incident frames itself instead as a successful wake-up call about the absence of healthy transparency and widespread participation on issues that should concern the public as consumers, and therefore as a lesson on how to scrutinize emerging technologies effectively [13] .
Solutions ?
Despite the novel provisions built into NRDA about the responsible development of nanotechnology, past experience as well as plausible risky future scenarios suggest that policy formulation today falls short of assessing the need for requiring much more coordinated, integrated, and extensive social research on the development and societal deployment of the emergent nanotechnologies. The manipulation of matter and the manufacturing of materials at the molecular level represent perhaps the highest stakes that a transformative technology has ever confronted us with as peoples and ecosystems. Commensurate with its unprecedented levels of techno-generative power, but also the levels of uncertainty involved as to its emergent societal assimilation, policy formulation ought to spell out the coordination of research programs in much more detail.
Noteworthy and pioneering steps in this direction are already paving the way toward more built-in foresight owing to the very NRDA provisions reviewed above. For the past 6 years, the largest NSF Center for Nanotechnology in Society, established at Arizona State University (CNS-ASU), has been producing novel collaborative modes of social research on nano-based R&D. These modes are guided by a policy philosophy of anticipatory governance. This is a model of policy generation predicated on the principle that the governance of technological R&D should be guided early on by building capacities for foresight , at least to some degree, among several stakeholders during the early stages of technological R&D [14] . The principle, the capacities, and the stakeholders referred to may be briefl y specifi ed as follows. The principle aims to strike a balance between the traditional technocratic model of public conformity to technological disruptions, on the one hand (that is, a model where widespread social implications are naturally accepted as the expected afterthoughts of innovative interventions), and the potentially unfruitful model, on the other hand, of relying on the banning or suspension of any exploration whatsoever at the outset (that is, where an aversion to entertaining even reasonable degrees of risk is automatically privileged over any potential social and economic benefi ts that may be obtained from engaging in scientifi c R&D exploration and technological application). The capacities for foresight involve understanding how the transformative technoscientifi c powers specifi c to nanotechnological developments may translate into societal impact and governance (e.g., policy and operational) matters. The primary stakeholders that the model addresses are (i) certain actors within R&D operations, such as the researchers, and (ii) certain publics.
Hand-in-hand with the philosophy of anticipatory governance goes an integrative paradigm of real-time technology assessment (RTTA) that the research programs at ASU translate into research design [15] . RTTA is based upon the integration of socio-scientifi c insights from two fairly recent fi elds of study: fi rst, insights about innovation resulting through the continuous interaction among agents working in diverse realms of institutional activity (e.g., [16 -18] ) and, second, insights from social studies of science and technology (e.g., [6, 19] ) about how the " social life " of technology in a variety of institutional settings (e.g., the laboratory, the courtroom, the advisory committee, the offi ce of technology-transfer services) is actually a co-production through interactions among scientists, the technologies, and other non-scientist social actors.
In the CNS-ASU research designs, social and human scholars are assigned to observe and study innovative science-making alongside natural scientists working in select nano-R&D laboratories across the US [14] . The aim of such collaboration is four-fold: (i) to compare past transformative technologies to nano-developments through historical case studies; (ii) to map nano-developments bibliometrically so as to follow the knowledge dynamics of the inventions and their geographical parameters of activity; (iii) to act as communication disseminator between the nanoscientifi c community and several communities in the public sphere; and thus (iv) to assess direction of development taking into account not only the nanoscientists ' perspectives but also those from the various publics [20] . Another research program sponsored by the same Center for Nanotechnology in Society is still more explicitly integrative as it addresses the laboratory as a place of governance head on. This is the socio-technical integration research program directed by Principal Investigator Erik Fisher. These studies involve a series of coordinated STS laboratory studies in which natural, social, and human scientists coordinate how to study and understand laboratory and research practices as these are taking place in real time. The intent is to identify which practices, how, and to what degree these may pose signifi cant socio-ethical and socio-political ramifi cations [8] .
Much else can be included in a commentary about current policy and research approaches to the societal implications of nanotechnology. For instance, one can further comment on the complex human-enhancements debates or the thorny surveillance security-privacy compromises harbored in the nanoscale new order of things (e.g., [21, 22] ). The CNS-ASU undertakings are already contributing a fair amount of fi ndings toward the eventual modulation of certain nanotechnological applications that " harbor " potential socio-technical " futures " . According to the RTTA design protocols, these are results attained consultatively and collaboratively, in conversation among a variety of key societal stakeholders. One example comes from the fi eld of personalized medicine. In this case, one of the modulating factors being brought to awareness is the need to assess the critical uncertainties involved in deploying medical diagnostic nanodevices (e.g., [23] ).
1 It may still be too early to penetrate an underdeveloped market with a technology so ready for applications, that is to say, to deploy it in social milieus not fully prepared to confront illness-free biosignatures as well as confronting those signaling future illnesses, fundamental choices naturally derived from its being deployed in society (e.g., [25] ). Another example comes from the fi eld of nano-enabled neuroprosthetics, or neural interface systems (NIS), or brain-machine interface (BMI) (e.g., [26] ). Such nano-cognitive bio-enhancement has been subject to refl exive assessment during its early stages of deployment in experimental and clinical contexts. Key ethical questions about consequences in myriad deployment possibilities have been addressed collaboratively: the specifi c types of identity concerns that such enhancements can posit, the host of clinical decisions to be made regarding personalitychanging procedures, the risk assessment to be carried out when deploying the technology in brain-damaged humans, and the transfer into civilian contexts of its military uses on human hosts, etc (e.g., [27] ). Philosophical arguments that are predicated on the ultimately indeterminate nature of the future exist against efforts such as these (e.g., [28] ). Still, results from these socio-technical design protocols, in which upstream societal considerations are deliberately integrated, show that R&D can indeed be guided toward anticipatory outcomes by having natural scientists work collaboratively with social and human scientists during the emerging stages of societal nanotechnological deployment.
